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THE HUMANITARIAN MONARCHY 
LEGISLATES: THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS AND ITS 161 
RULES OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 
LEAH M. NICHOLLS* 
INTRODUCTION 
In March 2005, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), released its Customary International Humanitarian Law, a 
work intended to articulate and justify the rules of customary 
international humanitarian law (IHL).1  This Note will explore some 
of the issues surrounding the ICRC’s publication, such as examining 
the wider role of the ICRC in IHL, debating the methodology used in 
the text, and finally, speculating on how the project will impact 
customary IHL in American and international tribunals.  This Note 
concludes that while the ICRC successfully articulated a global 
consensus on what international humanitarian law ought to be, it may 
have sacrificed some of its respect in the international community by 
departing from a traditional definition of customary law. 
 
Copyright © 2006 by Leah M. Nicholls. 
 * Leah M. Nicholls is a J.D./L.L.M. in international and comparative law candidate at 
Duke University School of Law and serves as the Editor-in-Chief of the Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law.  She would like to thank Professor Madeline Morris for her 
guidance and assistance with this Note. 
 1. The book is divided into two volumes, the first of which is an articulation of the rules, 
and the second of which is a two-part discussion of the practice that justifies the rules.  
Altogether, the work is over five thousand pages long.  The two primary leaders of the project 
are listed as authors of the first volume and editors of the second volume.  1  JEAN-MARIE 
HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005) [hereinafter 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW]; 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross eds., 2005).  See also David 
B. Rivken & Lee A. Casey, Editorial, Friend or Foe, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2005, at A22.  For a 
thorough summary of the study and a list of the rules, see Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect 
for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 175 (2005) 
[hereinafter Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law]. 
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A. A Brief Overview of Customary International Humanitarian Law 
To understand the significance of the ICRC’s attempt to 
articulate the rules of customary IHL, one must know at least the 
basic structure of the law in this area.  International law comes from 
four sources:  (1) treaties and agreements; (2) customary law; (3) 
general principles of law common to major legal systems; and (4) 
judicial decisions and scholarly teachings.2  Treaties and customary 
law have equal authority as international law.3  If they conflict, the 
“last in time” rule operates, meaning that whichever came into force 
most recently takes precedence.4  When treaties and customary law 
are not helpful, one may then consult general principles, which most 
frequently come into play to determine procedural matters.5  If an 
issue cannot be resolved after examining these sources, decision-
makers should then consult scholarly articles and judicial opinions.6  
However, as will be discussed in more detail below,7 overburdened 
judges often rely on scholarly works as definitive evidence of 
customary international law or general principles instead of 
conducting independent assessments of primary sources.8 
Customary International Humanitarian Law addresses customary 
international law, and specifically, customary IHL.9  Customary law is 
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law,”10 resulting from “a general and consistent practice of states 
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”11  Thus, a principle 
 
 2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES  
§ 102 (1987) (recognizing as sources of international law treaties and agreements; customary 
law; and general principles of law); see Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993 (recognizing that the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) can use “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations” to decide disputes). 
 3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES  
§ 102 cmt. j (1987). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at cmt. l. 
 6. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 2, art. 38. 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 167-68. 
 8. E.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 9. See 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 1.  IHL, also 
known as the law of war, is the body of law governing what actions a party to conflict may do.  
ICRC, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in Brief, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/ 
siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_in_brief?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 4, 2006). 
 10. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 2, art. 38(b). 
 11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES  
§ 102(2) (1987). 
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is considered customary law if many states across the world feel 
legally obliged to follow that principle.  This sense of legal obligation 
is commonly referred to as opinio juris. 
The ICRC spent nearly a decade determining when state practice 
and opinio juris in the area of IHL are sufficient to give rise to 
customary law and articulating that law.  The resulting work closely 
resembles an American-style restatement’s articulation of common 
law-based rules.12 
B. An Overview of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
The ICRC has its roots in an 1859 battle in Solferino, Italy.13  
Swiss businessman Henry Dunant, in Solferino on a business trip, was 
appalled that the wounded of both sides had been left to die and 
arranged for their care.14  Following that experience, he founded the 
predecessor to the ICRC, the International Committee for the Relief 
of the Wounded, and in 1864 helped to draft the first Geneva 
Convention, which created the concept of IHL.15  Today, the four 
Geneva Conventions and their Protocols are the basis of IHL.16 
From its infancy, the ICRC has been in the practice of creating 
law, but what is interesting about its most recent foray into law-
making is that it claims only to be writing down existing customary 
law.17  Whether it has done so accurately or whether it is continuing its 
practice of creating law is a matter of much debate. 
 
 12. Scott Horton, Book Review, N.Y.L.J., June 1, 2005, at 2. 
 13. François Bugnion, The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Development 
of International Humanitarian Law, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 191, 191-93 (2004) [hereinafter ICRC and 
the Development of IHL]. 
 14. Id. at 191-92. 
 15. Dunant was a member of the Committee and the Committee circulated the first draft of 
the Conventions.  Id. at 192-93. 
 16. ICRC, The Geneva Conventions: The Core of International Humanitarian Law, 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions (last visited Nov. 4, 2006). 
However, Protocol III, adopted December 8, 2005, is not really a basis for IHL as it simply adds 
an emblem to the Red Cross Movement (the Red Crystal) in order to include nations (such as 
Israel) whose religious traditions prevented them from adopting the Red Cross or the Red 
Crescent or who wished to use both symbols (such as Eritrea).  ICRC, About the Adoption of 
an Additional Emblem: Questions and Answers, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/ 
htmlall/emblem-questions-answers-281005, (last visited July 24, 2006). 
 17. See Introduction to 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 
1, at xxx-xxxii. 
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In addition to interpreting, articulating, and creating IHL,18 the 
ICRC is also associated with the national Red Cross societies, which 
work in areas decimated by war or natural disaster to reunite families 
and otherwise provide relief.  The ICRC also attempts to enforce laws 
protecting detainees by visiting detention centers and recommending 
changes that would bring the detaining state or party into compliance 
with IHL.19 
The ICRC’s authority to conduct these activities during armed 
conflict comes directly from the Geneva Conventions.20  The ICRC 
offers itself as a neutral organization which provides relief to affected 
persons and checks to ensure that all parties to the conflict are 
affording detainees appropriate detention conditions as well as 
communication with family members.21  Practically, to carry out these 
tasks, states must consent to the ICRC’s presence because the ICRC 
has no military force—a non-consenting state could simply push the 
ICRC out with tanks and guns.22  However, the ICRC is a highly-
regarded institution, and because it “operates with the expectation of 
being allowed to act,” it can harness a fair amount of political capital 
to obtain state consent.23 
 
 18. This comment is not meant to reflect the conclusion that the ICRC created law in its 
2005 assessment of customary IHL, but rather that the ICRC promotes IHL treaties, proposes 
United Nations programmes of action, and otherwise generally lobbies for the expansion of IHL 
and its enforcement.  See 2005 ICRC ANN. REP., 25-28 (2006); ICRC, United Nations, 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/section-united-nations (last visited Oct. 12, 
2006). 
 19. ICRC, Strengthening Protection and Respect of Prisoners and Detainees, 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/detention (last visited Nov. 4, 2006). 
 20. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field arts. 9-11, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea arts. 9-11, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 9-11, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949 arts. 10-12, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention IV].  There are some articles that appear identically in all four Geneva 
Conventions, which are commonly referred to as “Common Articles,” such as Common Article 
3.  The articles cited here are similar, but not identical. 
 21. ICRC, ICRC Visits to Persons Deprived of their Freedom: An Internationally 
Mandated Task, Implemented Worldwide, http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/ 
57JRME (last visited Oct. 27, 2006). 
 22. Alain Aeschlimann, Protection of Detainees: ICRC Action Behind Bars, 87 INT’L REV. 
OF THE RED CROSS 83, 90 (2005).  Though the ICRC has a treaty-based mandate to work in 
international conflicts, it still needs consent to physically enter a state.  Id.  E.g., Geneva 
Convention III, supra note 20, art. 125. 
 23. David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and the International Committee of the Red Cross, 12 
HUM. RTS. Q. 265, 270 (1990). 
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Moreover, if the ICRC discovers violations of IHL, it usually 
keeps its findings confidential.24  The ICRC justifies this practice by 
stressing that its utmost goal is to ensure better conditions for 
detainees and if it wants to continue to have access to detainees, 
which depends on the willingness of the detaining party, 
confidentiality is vital.  The ICRC is interested in maintaining a 
working relationship with the state involved and is not interested in 
its findings being exploited for political gain.25  Despite this goal of 
confidentiality, information gathered by the ICRC about the 
conditions under which the United States is detaining alleged Taliban 
and Al Qaeda members captured in Afghanistan did find its way into 
the media.  The ICRC denies having leaked that information to the 
press.26 
The ICRC stresses that its independence and neutrality are what 
enable it to continue this kind of work.27  If the organization appears 
to favor a certain ideology, many states would be less likely to permit 
the ICRC access to provide disaster relief and to aid detainees within 
their borders.  Because the ICRC has a reputation of being ‘above the 
fray’ and because states so often give the ICRC consent, many states 
fear the political backlash of denying the ICRC entrance.28  Over the 
years, the ICRC has gained substantial political capital.  In 
articulating the rules of customary IHL, the organization spent a lot 
of that capital, and the question is whether it spent too much.  In 
other words, does the ICRC still have legitimacy and respect as an 
impartial organization, or did it push its agenda too far to be taken 
seriously as a neutral body? 
Unlike most international organizations, the ICRC is not made 
up of member states, nor was it originally established by treaty 
agreement.29  As a result, the ICRC does not have to answer directly 
to states, the very bodies the ICRC is trying to force to comply with 
IHL.  In this way, the organization is a sort of monarch in the realm 
 
 24. Id.; Aeschlimann, supra note 22, at 99-100. 
 25. ICRC, US Detention Related to the Events of 11 September 2001 and its Aftermath—
the Role of the ICRC: Confidentiality.  Why?, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/ 
htmlall/usa-detention-update-121205?OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 12, 2006).  See ICRC, 
ICRC Visits to Persons Deprived of their Freedom, supra, note 21. 
 26. ICRC, US Detention Related to the Events of 11 September 2001 and its Aftermath—
The Role of the ICRC, supra note 25. 
 27. Aeschlimann, supra note 22, at 98-99. 
 28. The ICRC visited 570,000 detainees in eighty states during 2004.  ICRC, Strengthening 
Protection and Respect of Prisoners and Detainees, supra note 19. 
 29. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. 
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of IHL.  It both created the body of IHL and wrote its most recently 
articulated rules; it is one of the most effective enforcers of IHL; and 
because it is considered an expert in the interpretation and 
application of IHL, it is often called upon to advise judges in 
international tribunals.30  The ICRC has legislative, executive, and 
judicial qualities, making it effectively a monarch.  With the 
publication of Customary International Humanitarian Law, the ICRC 
may have overstepped the limits of its legislative power, and may 
have prompted a revolt. 
The ICRC has maintained its monarchical position by not 
pushing states too far, and by remaining neutral.  Neutrality is so 
important, that “[f]or the ICRC, neutrality is a condition for action”; 
the ICRC cannot offer services to parties engaged in conflict if it has 
taken a side.31  The ICRC has remained, fundamentally, a private 
Swiss organization—even the symbol of the Red Cross was never 
intended to be a religious symbol, but merely a reverse of the Swiss 
flag.32  Switzerland was designated the depository for the ICRC-
inspired Geneva Conventions.33  The Swiss tradition of neutrality still 
plays an important role in the ICRC’s ability to legitimately claim 
neutrality, and the ICRC’s need to maintain its humanitarian work is 
cited by Switzerland as a reason for remaining neutral.34  The ICRC 
was able to thrive through both world wars due to Switzerland’s 
neutral position—it ensured that the organization was not overtaken 
by warring parties, causing it to lose its own neutral status.35 
 
 30. The ICRC is consistently called upon as an expert witness in the International Criminal 
Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.  However, because of the ICRC’s mandate of 
confidentiality, it generally does not testify as a factual witness.  See Anne-Marie La Rosa, 
Humanitarian Organizations and International Criminal Tribunals, or Trying to Square the 
Circle, 88 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 169, 175-76 (2006); Kate Mackintosh, Current Issues 
and Comments, Note for Humanitarian Organizations on Cooperation with International 
Tribunals, 86 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 131, 135-36, 138-41 (2004). 
 31. François Bugnion, Dir. of Int’l Law and Cooperation, ICRC, Swiss Neutrality as Viewed 
by the International Committee of the Red Cross, Address Before the Nouvelle Société Helvetique 
at the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Museum (May 26, 2004) (ICRC, trans.), 
http://www.icrc.org/eng (follow “About the ICRC”  hyperlink; then follow “Swiss Neutrality as 
Viewed by the International Committee of the Red Cross” hyperlink) [hereinafter Swiss 
Neutrality]. 
 32. ICRC, About the Adoption of an Additional Emblem, supra note 16. 
 33. Geneva Convention I, supra note 20, art. 57; Geneva Convention II, supra note 20, art. 
56; Geneva Convention III, supra note 20, art. 137; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 20, art. 
152. 
 34. For a detailed analysis of this argument, see Alexander R. McLin, Other International 
Issues, The ICRC: An Alibi for Swiss Neutrality?, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 495 (1999). 
 35. Id. 
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Though the ICRC has recently tried to become more 
independent, it has retained a cozy relationship with the Swiss 
government.  In fact, the Swiss government is second only to the 
United States in contributions to the budget of the ICRC.36  
Traditionally, the ICRC exclusively recruited Swiss citizens and still 
requires members of its governing board, the ICRC Assembly, to be 
Swiss citizens.37  However, in 1992, out of a realization that the Swiss 
government, though neutral, still had the ability to express strong 
opinions about world political issues, the ICRC decided to distance 
itself somewhat from Switzerland.38  It did so in order to disassociate 
itself from any Swiss condemnation of international behavior that 
may hinder the ICRC in its mission; Switzerland has a duty to keep 
itself out of conflicts, but not out of politics.39  Thus in 1992, the ICRC 
began recruiting employees of non-Swiss nationality.40  By 2003, 
approximately half of new recruits were not Swiss,41 and English 
became the working language for many of the delegations.42  The 
ICRC also signed an agreement with the Swiss Federal Council, 
establishing the independence of the organization from the state, 
including the inviolability of ICRC premises, except when authorized 
by the Swiss President.43  All this distancing from Switzerland, 
however, does not mean the ICRC does not remain appreciative of its 
neutrality.  If the state were to give up its neutrality, “the ICRC 
should reexamine its relationship with Switzerland,”44 but at least one 
observer believes that the ICRC is so well established and 
independent that a change in Switzerland’s neutrality would not 
devastate the organization.45 
 
 36. 2004 ICRC ANN. REP. 351 (2005). 
 37. STATUTES OF THE INT’L RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT art. 5 §1 (1987) 
reprinted in ICRC, STATUTES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED 
CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT 10 (1986); Swiss Neutrality, supra note 31. 
 38. Swiss Neutrality, supra note 31. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. ICRC, Working for the ICRC: Committed Professionals and People, Policy of 
Openness, http://www.icrc.org/eng (follow “About the ICRC” hyperlink; then follow “Human 
Resources” hyperlink; then follow “Working for the ICRC: Committed Professionals and 
People” hyperlink) (last visited July 24, 2006). 
 42. Swiss Neutrality, supra note 31. 
 43. Agreement Between the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss 
Federal Council to Determine the Legal Status of the Committee in Switzerland, ICRC-Switz., 
Mar. 19, 1993, reprinted in 33 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 152 (1993). 
 44. Swiss Neutrality, supra note 31. 
 45. McLin, supra note 34, at 517-18. 
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Though the ICRC depends upon its own neutrality, and often 
believes that all parties to a conflict are committing atrocities, it has 
not been perfect and is sometimes accused of being partisan.46  The 
most notable is the charge that the ICRC is biased against Israel.47  
The recent adoption of the Red Crystal as an additional emblem of 
the organization is one effort the ICRC has taken to ameliorate such 
allegations and maintain its neutral reputation.48  Prior to December 
2005, the Israeli equivalent of a national Red Cross or Red Crescent, 
Magen David Adom (the Red Shield of David), was not able to join 
the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement because it 
did not use either the Red Cross or Red Crescent emblem.49  This 
policy had been criticized, especially because the Palestinian Red 
Crescent Society is recognized.50  Despite the ICRC’s efforts to be 
more inclusive, some observers see the adoption of the Red Crystal as 
anti-Semitic because the Shield of David, a Jewish religious symbol, 
was not simultaneously adopted.51  However, the new rules do allow 
Magen David Adom to adopt an emblem incorporating the Shield of 
David and the new Red Crystal.52 
The ICRC has also been viewed as having an anti-American 
agenda, particularly by conservatives in the United States.53  Much of 
this criticism stems from the quick and ready ICRC confirmation that 
leaked reports stating the United States tortured detainees at 
Guantánamo Bay were authentic and accurate.  As a result, its 
 
 46. When confronted by a Serbian student questioning the ICRC’s neutrality, an ICRC 
attorney, formerly head of the ICRC’s field office in Nis, Serbia, described the Kosovo conflict 
as one in which both sides committed horrific atrocities.  Joy Elyahou, Legal Advisor to ICRC’s 
Operations Division, Presentation at the International Committee of the Red Cross: 
Introduction to International Humanitarian Law and its Application in Practice (July 19, 2005). 
 47. Boris Ryvkin, Human Rights for Whom?, REPUBLICAN VOICES, June 2005, 
http://www.republicanvoices.org/human_rights.html (last visited July 24, 2006). 
 48. The Red Crystal emblem is the outline of a red diamond shape and would be used 
where the Red Cross or Red Crescent emblems would otherwise be used.  ICRC, About the 
Adoption of an Additional Emblem, supra note 16. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Charles Krauthammer, Op-Ed., Red Cross Snub, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2000, at A23; 
MDA Exec: US Should Allow Money for Red Cross, INT’L CHRISTIAN EMBASSY JERUSALEM 
NEWS, July 16, 2003, http://www.icej.org/article/mda_exec_us_should_allow_money_for_red_ 
cross; Posting of Jeffrey Smith to ‘New’ Rules of Armed Conflict, http://livejournal.com/ 
users/maelorin/224437.html (Dec. 12, 2005, 16:42 EST). 
 51. Anne Dousse, La Politique Etrangere Qualifiee d’Antisemite!, LE MATIN (Switz.), Nov. 
29, 2005. 
 52. ICRC, About the Adoption of an Additional Emblem, supra note 16. 
 53. See, e.g., Ryvkin, supra note 47; Rivkin & Casey, supra note 1. 
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commitment to confidentially was seriously questioned.54  The ICRC 
certainly remains critical of America’s continuing detention of alleged 
terrorists at Guantánamo Bay and in other locations, concluding that 
such detention in and of itself is a violation of IHL.55  Though others 
have viewed such criticism as an indication that the ICRC is 
becoming ideological and stooping to less-than-neutral political 
tactics, the ICRC counters by saying that “it would be out of the 
question to adopt a neutral attitude toward violations of the Geneva 
Conventions.”56  Despite the official assertions of the ICRC, many 
commentators fear that the organization is in the process of sinking to 
the level of other politically-centered organizations and is losing its 
‘above the fray’ status, thereby also losing its ability to convince states 
to increase IHL compliance.57 
Historically, the ICRC has been seen as a neutral and non-
ideological body.  Despite its frequent involvement in areas of 
conflict, the ICRC was not the subject of any armed attack until 2003, 
during operations in Iraq.58  For the most part, the ICRC has been 
successful as a creator and promoter of IHL and has had a fair 
amount of success in ensuring better conditions for detainees.59  The 
ICRC has gained access to detainees in most international and 
internal conflicts and has been most effective when it portrays itself, 
not as a body concerned with solving legal questions, but as an 
organization concerned primarily with helping individuals.60  
However, its recent release of Customary International Humanitarian 
Law may jeopardize the ICRC’s privileged position in the 
international community. 
 
 54. Review & Outlook, Red Double-Crossed Again: The ICRC Betrays America—and the 
Geneva Conventions, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2004, at A12 [hereinafter Red Double-Crossed 
Again]. 
 55. ICRC, US Detention Related to the Events of 11 September 2001 and its Aftermath—
the Role of the ICRC, supra note 25. 
 56. Swiss Neutrality, supra note 31. 
 57. See Kenneth Anderson’s Law of War and Just War Theory Blog, Wall Street Journal 
Editorial on the ICRC, http://kennethandersonlawofwar.blogspot.com/2005/05/wall-street-
journal-editorial-on-icrc.html (May 23, 2005, 16:32 EST); Kenneth Anderson’s Law of War and 
Just War Theory Blog, Lee Casey and David Rivkin on the ICRC, http://kenneth 
andersonlawofwar.blogspot.com/2005/04/lee-casey-and-david-rivkin-on-icrc.html (Apr. 11, 2005, 
10:22 EST); Rivkin & Casey, supra note 1; Red Double-Crossed Again, supra note 54. 
 58. Red Cross Cuts Operations, BBC NEWS, Nov. 8, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/middle_east/3252723.stm. 
 59. This is based on the sheer numbers of detainees that the ICRC has been able to visit.  
ICRC, Strengthening Protection and Respect of Prisoners and Detainees, supra note 19. 
 60. Forsythe, supra note 23, at 271. 
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I.  THE WORK ITSELF: AN EXAMINATION OF CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
In March 2005, the ICRC published Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, a list of the 161 rules of customary international 
humanitarian law accompanied by explanation and justification.  On 
the one hand, since the ICRC is one of the primary enforcers and 
creators of IHL, it seems appropriate that it be the organization to 
conduct an analysis of the foggy world of customary IHL.  However, 
on the other hand, one could argue that such a project conducted by 
the ICRC could not possibly be objective:  the ICRC is not a 
disinterested bystander, but an organization that actively promotes 
more comprehensive IHL and describes itself as the “guardian” of 
IHL.61  By promoting IHL through its activities, the ICRC actually 
contributes to what it can consider in its evaluation of what 
constitutes customary law.62  This engenders a situation where the 
ICRC creates customary law by encouraging states to act in a 
particular way, and then uses those state actions to justify labeling it 
as customary law. 
Traditionally, customary law is meant to reflect the world as it 
actually exists and is not intended to reflect aspirations or ideals.63  
Knowing that international and domestic judges are likely to treat this 
listing similarly to the way American judges treat restatements of 
common law (citing to these works as a shortcut for a detailed 
exploration of complex law, or otherwise generally treating them as 
accurately reflecting the law), the ICRC had an incentive to create 
rules favorable to its own activities.  The extent to which the ICRC 
engaged in such bias is discussed below. 
A. The Process and Methodology of Customary International 
Humanitarian Law 
By the early 1990s, international humanitarian groups grew 
concerned over the suffering that resulted from failure to respect 
IHL.  At the 1993 International Conference for the Protection of War 
Victims, a resolution was passed that called for a convention of 
 
 61. ICRC, The Basics of International Humanitarian Law, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/ 
siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0850/$File/ICRC_002_0850.PDF!Open (last visited July 24, 2006). 
 62. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 109 (Oct. 2, 1995); ICRC and the Development of IHL, supra note 13. 
 63. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11 (discussing the definition of customary 
international law). 
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intergovernmental experts to study “practical means of promoting full 
respect for and compliance with [IHL].”64  In January 1995, the group 
of experts designated in response to the resolution met and made 
several recommendations for increasing knowledge and effective 
implementation of IHL, including the recommendation that the 
ICRC, in conjunction with researchers from all over the world, put 
together a report outlining the customary rules of IHL in 
international and non-international armed conflicts.65  The 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movements adopted this recommendation and mandated that the 
ICRC carry it out.66  The stated purpose of the project was not merely 
academic:  it was actually meant to create a tool that would enable 
more effective implementation of IHL.67  Since the purpose of the 
study was a progressive one, it provided another strong incentive for 
the ICRC to push for an expansive view of customary IHL. 
There are a plethora of multilateral treaties which address the 
issue of IHL, but not all states are parties to every treaty and a 
majority of the treaties only pertain to international conflict.68  One of 
the major projects of the ICRC was to determine which treaty 
provisions have become customary and therefore applicable to all 
states regardless of whether the state has signed the treaty, and to 
discover which provisions are also applicable to non-international 
conflicts.69  The division between international and non-international 
conflict dates to the Geneva Conventions, some of the few treaties to 
which every state is a party.70  The Geneva Conventions, with the 
 
 64. International Conference for the Protection of War Victims, Geneva, Switz, Aug. 30-
Sept. 1, 1993, Final Declaration, art. II [hereinafter Final Declaration]. 
 65. Introduction to 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 1, 
at xxvii. 
 66. Id.  The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is the umbrella organization for the 
ICRC and the national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.  ICRC, International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement, http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/movement (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2006). 
 67. Final Declaration, supra note 64, art. II. 
 68. E.g., Geneva Conventions I-IV, supra note 20; Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 69. See Introduction to 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 
1, at xxviii-xxix. 
 70. Palestine attempted to become a party in 1989 and declared that it would adhere to the 
Geneva Conventions, but because the Swiss Federal Council was not in a position to determine 
that Palestine was a state, its application to join the Convention was denied.  ICRC, States Party 
to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/Web 
Sign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (last visited July 24, 2006). 
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exception of the very vague and general Common Article 3, only 
apply to international conflict.71 
The ICRC considers the Geneva Conventions to be an excellent 
indicator of what is customary,72 but in order for a treaty, even a well-
accepted treaty, to be customary, there must still be state practice and 
opinio juris.73  As a future International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) judge74 and Customary International 
Humanitarian Law steering committee and research team member75 
Theodor Meron noted, humanitarian law is an area of law in which 
states more readily accept norms than carry them out; the treaty may 
be an indication of a norm, but is not necessarily an indicator of 
practice associated with it.76 
Not only is this distinction important in compiling a list of 
customary law, but it also has practical implications even though all 
states are parties to the Geneva Conventions.  For example, the 
question of whether reservations to or withdrawals from the treaty 
have substantive meaning could arise.77  Additionally, customary 
status could carry more moral weight and encourage compliance with 
a particular law.  Most importantly, however, the Geneva 
Conventions may not be directly applicable under a certain set of 
circumstances.  The issue of whether particular parts of the Geneva 
Conventions are customary was decided by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua case.  There, a U.S. reservation in a 
bilateral treaty prevented the Geneva Conventions from being 
 
 71. Geneva Conventions I-IV, supra note 20, Common Art. 3.  The definitions of 
international conflicts and “conflict not of an international character” are contentious, 
especially in present conflicts with terrorist organizations.  One of the central disagreements is 
whether there are any conflicts that do not fall into either category and are thus not governed by 
the Geneva Conventions at all, or whether the two categories together encompass all types of 
conflict.  For example, compare the majority and concurring court of appeals opinions in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 41-42, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 72. See Introduction to 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 
1, at xxx. 
 73. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12 (discussing the definition of customary 
international law). 
 74. ICTY, Organs of the Tribunal, http://www.un.org/icty/index.html (follow “ICTY at a 
Glance” hyperlink; then follow “Organs of the Tribunal” hyperlink) (last visited July 24, 2006). 
 75. Acknowledgements to 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra 
note 1, at xxi-xxii. 
 76. Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 348, 
363, 367 (1987). 
 77. For example, if the entirety of the Geneva Conventions is customary law, a state’s legal 
obligations would not change even if they withdrew from the treaty or reserved a particular 
article. 
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directly applicable.78  The ICJ determined that the provisions in 
question were indeed customary law without actually examining state 
practice.  Meron criticizes this determination for its failure to consider 
state practice.79 
The 1977 Protocols, often cited in the ICRC study, present a 
separate difficulty.  Approximately three-quarters of all states are 
parties to these Protocols, with the significant exception of the United 
States and other states with substantial and ongoing internal conflict, 
such as Afghanistan and Israel.80  Protocol I applies to international 
conflicts, increasing the protections for military and civilian personnel 
and expanding those definitions to cover more individuals.81  The 
ICRC believes that some parts of this Protocol state customary law 
even though there is a lack of practice in conformity with the Protocol 
by states who are not parties.82  However, unlike the core Geneva 
Conventions, the ICRC did not consider the entirety of Protocol I to 
be customary law.  For example, Article 44.3 of Protocol I allows for 
an exception from the distinction principle in situations where 
distinction is not practically possible, provided the combatant carries 
his or her arms openly.83  If the exception is applicable, a captured 
combatant would be considered a Prisoner of War (POW) even 
though not wearing a distinctive uniform, assuming the other 
conditions are met.  Practically, if this article were customary law, 
then the United States would not legally be able to deny POW status 
to captured individuals on the basis of their failure to be in uniform, 
provided the exception is applicable in the particular circumstances.  
However, the ICRC’s Rule 106 of customary IHL requires a 
combatant to be in a distinctive uniform in order to receive POW 
 
 78. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 217-18 (June 27). 
 79. Id.; Meron, supra note 76 at 348-49, 352, 357-58. 
 80. ICRC, States Party to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, supra 
note 70.  When “Protocols” is used, it is generally a reference only to Protocol I and Protocol II, 
the 1977 Protocols.  Protocol III, signed December 8, 2005 is not relevant to the substance of 
Customary International Humanitarian Law. 
 81. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Protocol I]. 
 82. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 391-95 
(discussing Rule 108, which denies mercenaries the right to POW status); Meron, supra note 76, 
at 350. 
 83. The distinction principle states that combatants must clearly distinguish themselves 
from civilians by the use of uniforms.  Protocol I, supra note 81, art. 44.3. 
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status and does not allow for any exceptions.84  The ICRC did deem 
some articles of Protocol I to be customary IHL, including Article 59, 
mirrored in Rule 37, which prohibits direct attacks against non-
defended localities.85  In that case, the ICRC justified its position by 
maintaining that Article 59 of Protocol I codified already-existing 
customary law when drafted.86 
The ICRC’s treatment of Protocol II is more controversial. 
Protocol II provides numerous and specific protections for victims 
and holds individuals criminally liable if they violate IHL during non-
international conflict.87  Many of these protections mirror those 
afforded to victims of international conflicts in the Geneva 
Conventions.88  As was the case for Protocol I, there is virtually no 
state practice of the provisions of Protocol II by non-signatories.89  
However, the ICRC appeals to “common sense” in deciding that 
most of its rules of customary IHL, particularly the parts stemming 
from the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II, apply evenly to all 
types of conflict.90  This move is an important one in promulgating 
IHL because many states with ongoing internal conflicts are not party 
to Protocol II.91  However, the ICRC has been criticized for its 
unwarranted narrowing of the gap between the IHL governing 
international conflict and that governing non-international conflict; in 
this particular area, the ICRC efforts have especially been viewed 
more as making law than merely documenting it.92 
 
 84. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 384.  This 
example is not meant to imply that the author considers U.S. denial of POW status on the basis 
of lack of uniform to be legally justifiable, but only that the United States is not bound by all 
provisions of Protocol I. 
 85. Id. at 122. 
 86. Id. at 122-26; Protocol I, supra note 81, art. 59. 
 87. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
609 [hereinafter Protocol II]. 
 88. Compare id. art. 5, with Geneva Convention III, supra note 20, Part III. 
 89. See Meron, supra note 76, at 350. 
 90. Introduction to 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 1, 
at xxix. 
 91. ICRC, States Party to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, supra 
note 70.  States with internal conflict are understandably hesitant to agree to international 
regulation of what they would regard as internal affairs between the government and its citizens. 
 92. See Malcolm MacLaren & Felix Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of 
International Law: The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6 
GERMAN L. J. 1217, 1236 (2005). 
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Though there are few treaties that address non-international 
conflict,93 the ICRC has determined that there are 133 rules of 
customary IHL that govern both international and non-international 
conflict in an identical fashion; another nine that govern international 
conflict and that “arguably” also govern non-international conflict; 
and four rules which are similar, but not identical, in governing the 
two types of conflict.94  Only twelve of the 161 rules promulgated by 
the ICRC apply exclusively to international conflict.95  These numbers 
indicate that the ICRC’s assessment of what constitutes customary 
IHL in non-international conflict is far more expansive than 
mainstream opinion. 
When the ICRC did consider actual state practice, it did so by 
calling on research teams from forty-seven states to submit reports 
concerning their states’ practice, as well as teams charged with 
researching international sources, such as treaties, international 
tribunal decisions, and international organization activities.96  The 
states selected appear to reflect geographical and economic diversity, 
but tend toward military passivity, and the teams were primarily 
comprised of professors and lawyers.97  Thus, like American-style 
restatements, the study is ostensibly an academic endeavor and not 
the product of direct observers of military conduct.98 
B. “State Practice” in Customary International Humanitarian Law 
As discussed above, customary international law has two 
components:  state practice and opinio juris.99  Traditionally, the 
objective portion of customary law counted only state actions that 
complied with customary law.100  Opinio juris is the subjective portion 
 
 93. Introduction to 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 1, 
at xxviii. 
 94. See Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 1, at 
198-212. 
 95. That leaves three rules which are only applicable in non-international conflict.  See id. 
 96. Acknowledgements to 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra 
note 1, at xix-xxii. 
 97. See id. 
 98. The research teams were made up of lawyers and professors, not military personnel.  
The exception is Colonel Mugo Geć of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Id. at xix. 
 99. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 2, art. 38(c); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) 
(1987). 
 100. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 102(2) (1987). 
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and is commonly determined via verbal pronunciations of the state 
made in conjunction with the state’s actions.101  In its study, the ICRC 
claims to be utilizing classical customary law analysis, but actually 
adopts a broader view of state practice.102  The ICRC includes verbal 
practice as part of state practice.103  The organization cites profusely 
for this analytical decision, however, the sources cited take a more 
narrow view of what constitutes verbal practice than the ICRC, which 
includes statements made at the meetings of international 
organizations and conferences in its definition of state practice.104  
Common sense dictates that a state’s declarations at such meetings 
tend to be more aspirational than practical because they are often 
tailored to meet a political goal.  For example, no state admits that its 
policy involves torture—virtually every state will deny it.105  Yet, many 
states, including the United States,106 China, Pakistan, and Egypt, 
engage in some level of torture.107  Certainly, verbal practice that 
more accurately reflects a state’s actual practice, such as internal 
orders, military manuals, legislation, and domestic judicial rulings, are 
appropriately considered in conjunction with physical state practice, 
particularly when one acknowledges the difficulty of determining 
what occurs on the battlefield.108 
 
 101. For an example of a justice painstakingly reviewing centuries of state practice under 
traditional customary law analysis, see The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686-712 (1900). 
 102. Introduction to 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 1, 
at xxii-xxxix.  In characterizing its method as “classical,” the ICRC may have been using the 
development of customary international human rights law (more or less the peacetime version 
of IHL) as a point of comparison.  Customary law in that area has historically been developed 
by academic declaration after mounting frustrations with states (especially the United States) 
unwilling to sign treaties or unwilling to fulfill their treaty obligations (creating a lack of state 
practice).  Staking out aspirational customary laws may have been the only way to progress.  For 
further discussion of this topic, see Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary 
International Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (1995); Bruno Simma & Philip 
Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 
AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82 (1989). 
 103. Introduction to 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 1, 
at xxxii-xxxiii. 
 104. Id. 
 105. An exception was Afghanistan in 1990.  2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 2136. 
 106. Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 
2004, at A1. 
 107. Human Rights Watch, Torture Worldwide, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/04/27/china 
10549.htm (last visited July 24, 2006). 
 108.  Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 99 (Oct. 2, 1995) (stating that “it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
07__NICHOLLS.DOC 3/9/2007  10:07 AM 
2006] THE HUMANITARIAN MONARCHY LEGISLATES 239 
An examination of the practice volume of Customary 
International Humanitarian Law indicates that the ICRC utilized 
traditional evidence of actual state policy (if not state practice), such 
as military manuals.109  When treaties existed, the ICRC also relied 
heavily on those.110  But as discussed above, the ICRC’s use of treaty 
membership as evidence of state practice is also controversial.111  
There are many exceptions to the authors’ generally conservative 
approach toward cataloguing state policy, such as a citation to an 
interview between Chinese leader Mao Zedong and a British 
journalist in which Mao assured the interviewer of lenient treatment 
of captured Japanese,112 and a citation to comment made by Myanmar 
officials denouncing the use of children as porters for soldiers before 
the Committee of the Rights of the Child.113 
Commentators have criticized the ICRC in its review of state 
practices.  Specifically, many are concerned that the ICRC did not 
weigh state practice according to whether the state actually engaged 
in military conflict:  practice by New Zealand seems to be given the 
same consideration as practice by the United States.114  Some suggest 
that countries who do not engage in military operations promulgate 
and practice customary laws that severely constrain military activity—
they need not balance the need for IHL against the costs of an 
effective military force.115  Continental Europe, for example, no 
longer engages in large-scale military defense operations and thus 
European nations do not have to concern themselves with figuring 
out the logistics of implementing IHL in real situations or with any 
 
pinpoint the actual behavior of the troops in the field for the purposes of establishing whether 
they in fact comply with, or disregard, certain standards of behaviour”). 
 109. 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 1, passim (see, for 
example, the use of military manuals in the discussion of Rule 132 regarding the return of 
displaced persons on page 3011). 
 110. Id. passim (see, for example, the use of treaties in the discussion of Rule 149 regarding 
responsibility for violations of IHL on page 3507). 
 111. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 112. 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 2136-37. 
 113. Id. at 2139. 
 114. This comment is meant to reflect the fact that the United States is engaged in far more 
military activity than New Zealand.  Posting of Chris Borgen to Opinio Juris, Kenneth 
Anderson on Who’s Writing the Laws of Armed Conflict, http://lawofnations.blogspot.com/ 
2005/04/kenneth-anderson-on-whos-writing-laws.html (Apr. 11, 2005, 23:30 EST). 
 115. Id.; Kenneth Anderson’s Law of War and Just War Theory Blog, Another ICRC 
Issue—the New Customary Humanitarian Law Study, http://kennethandersonlawofwar.blog 
spot.com/2005/05/another-icrc-issue-new-customary.html (last visited May 23, 2005, 16:57 EST) 
[hereinafter Another ICRC Issue]. 
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negative consequences to military operations, and neither does an 
international organization such as the ICRC.116  This criticism has 
merit to the extent that it raises the issue of implementation:  if 
countries engaged in conflict do not agree with the IHL or find IHL 
rules overly restrictive of military operations, then the law is not 
practiced by any relevant state and cannot reasonably be considered 
“customary.” 
In cataloguing state practice, the ICRC frequently cites to its own 
activities and documents as well as those of other international 
organizations.117  The ICTY specifically encouraged the ICRC to 
count its successful campaigns pushing states to comply with IHL 
toward customary international law, saying 
[T]he ICRC has made a remarkable contribution by appealing to 
the parties to armed conflicts to respect international humanitarian 
law . . . .  The practical results the ICRC has thus achieved in 
inducing compliance with international humanitarian law ought 
therefore to be regarded as an element of actual international 
practice; this is an element that has been conspicuously 
instrumental in the emergence or crystallization of customary 
rules.118 
This sanction by the ICTY, however, only explicitly covers those 
instances in which the ICRC’s activities resulted in changed state or 
non-state party practices.119  The ICTY’s point seems to be that the 
impetus for state action counted as customary law could come from 
the ICRC, not that the ICRC’s activities themselves could be 
considered state practice.120  However, in citing itself, the ICRC 
includes its activities and statements regardless of whether states 
actually altered their practices as a result of ICRC pressure.121  For 
example, the Red Cross activities listed in support of Rule 47, the rule 
prohibiting attacks against persons hors de combat (non-combatants), 
consist almost entirely of appeals to warring parties and press 
 
 116. Because the ICRC operates in areas of conflict, it is arguably more sensitive to 
logistical considerations than many states.  Another ICRC Issue, supra note 115. 
 117. 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 1, passim (see, for 
example, the use of ICRC activities and the activities of other non-governmental organizations 
in the discussion of the section of Rule 109 that refers to the evacuation of the wounded, sick, 
and shipwrecked on pages 2611-14). 
 118. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 109 (Oct. 2, 1995). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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releases, not altered state actions.122  Similarly, in other sections, the 
ICRC cites to its own commentary and training programs as evidence 
of state practice.123  Thus, the ICRC is, to some extent, participating in 
an exercise of reaffirming its own actions as the guardian of IHL. 
Beyond the above ICTY statement, other commentators have 
proposed that ICRC activities are useful to assess state practice 
because the ICRC acts as a proxy or advocate for the victims of war.124  
IHL was created “precisely to protect the least powerful actors from 
the most powerful.  In the case of war, those are the individual 
civilians.”125  The entire purpose of IHL is to provide protection for 
individuals victimized by states and other warring parties.  Activists 
naturally find this argument appealing,126 but ultimately it is legally 
unsupported and it raises significant state consent issues. 
Customary International Humanitarian Law frequently cites the 
reports and activities of other international organizations, such as 
United Nations (UN) bodies, regional organizations such as the 
League of Arab States, and international tribunals as evidence.127  The 
ICRC’s reliance on its own activities as well as those of non-state 
parties are, by definition, not actually state practice.  However, the 
study seems to depend most heavily on the military manuals, which 
are a closer approximation of actual state practice.128  In justifying a 
given rule, the study cites, in the following order:  treaties, national 
practice (military manuals, national legislation, national case-law, and 
other national practice), practice of international organizations and 
conferences (UN, other international organizations, international 
conferences), practice of international judicial and quasi-judicial 
bodies, practice of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement, and other practice.129  Strictly speaking, only the category 
“other national practice” could contain the sort of state practice 
 
 122. 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 968-70. 
 123. Id. at 486. 
 124. Posting of Peggy McGuinness to Opinio Juris, ICRC as Proxy in Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, http://lawofnations.blogspot.com/2005/04/icrc-as-proxy-in-
customary.html (Apr. 12, 2005, 12:47 EST). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 1, passim (see, for 
example, the use of UN, League of Arab States, and ICTY activities in the discussion of Rule 40 
regarding respect for cultural property on pages 800-03). 
 128. Id. passim (see, for example, the relative use of military manuals in the discussion of 
the section of Rule 51 regarding private property in occupied territory on pages 1046-59). 
 129. See, e.g., id. at 1076-115 (practice relating to the rule against pillage). 
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envisioned by those taking a narrow view of what could be considered 
customary international law.130 
In fact, the “other national practice” cited to support Rule 52 
(the prohibition of pillage), includes twenty public, verbal statements 
condemning and reporting pillage (mostly in the context of UN 
debate), two internal documents opposing pillage, one denial of 
pillage in response to accusations, one boasting of pillage, one order 
to refrain from pillage, one opinion of a military lawyer, and one 
actual instance of a state refraining from pillage.131  This shows a 
picture of states publicly denouncing pillage, but in many cases, 
actually participating in pillage.  From this information alone, one 
may conclude that pillage is frequently practiced, so under a 
traditional analysis, a customary law prohibiting pillage could not 
exist.132 
Additionally, the ICRC cites unusual evidence that highlights the 
policies and practices of nations who never actually engage in 
warfare.133  One commentator noted, “The premise seems to be that 
customary international law of war is established by he who writes the 
most and longest memos.  What I have read thus far is a long, long 
way from the canonical notion that customary law is established by . . 
. what states actually do.”134  In conclusion, the ICRC is not applying 
the ‘classic’ determination of what law is customary because of its 
heavy reliance on factors outside of actual state practice, including 
 
 130. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Symposium: Human Rights on the 
Eve of the Next Century: UN Human Rights Standards & US Law: The Current Illegitimacy of 
International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 328 (1997) (“This new CIL 
[customary international law] does not reflect the actual practice of states.  If the traditional 
state practice requirement were still a necessary prerequisite to the development of a CIL norm, 
there would be very little customary international human rights law, for ‘it is still customary for 
a depressingly large number of States to trample on the human rights of their nationals.’  The 
change in the way CIL is created, from the ‘accretion of practices’ to a more ‘purposive creation 
of custom’ through treaties and United Nations resolutions, marks a ‘radical innovation, and 
indeed reflects a radical conception.’”). 
 131. The state refraining from pillage was nineteenth-century Algeria, which did so out of 
respect for Islamic law.  The ICRC carefully qualified an instance where a military official 
boasted of his troops’ pillaging, noting that that particular officer did not reflect the views of the 
rest of his military.  2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 
1101-05. 
 132. National military manuals, statutes, and case-law indicate at least an attempt by states 
to eradicate pillage, although the numerous cases in which pillage was found could support the 
conclusion that pillage is not a rare occurrence.  Id. at 1078-101. 
 133. Borgen, supra note 114. 
 134. Another ICRC Issue, supra note 115. 
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public verbal statements and the actions of organizations other than 
states.135 
Customary international law also requires that the acts be 
accompanied by opinio juris, the belief that one’s actions are legally 
required.136  This is normally determined by observing state 
compliance with the obligation or omission and any condemnation by 
the state of another state’s failure to act in accordance with the rule.137  
Evidence of opinio juris frequently overlaps with evidence of state 
practice.  This is particularly true of this study, since state practice is 
determined by verbal acts, and the study itself does not distinguish 
evidence of state practice from opinio juris.138  As such, a separate 
analysis of the ICRC’s treatment of opinio juris will not be attempted. 
It is clear that the ICRC did not carry out this study in 
conformity with the traditional methods of assessing what state 
practice is customary.  Whether the ICRC ought to have been more 
conservative in its approach is a different question.  From a legal 
perspective, the ICRC has upturned the basis upon which customary 
law rests and its methodology reflects a radical departure from 
canonical law.  However, if one considers that in many conflicts, even 
the basic protections of the Geneva Conventions are not honored, 
then a true statement of state practice would not enable one to 
articulate progressive customary rules of IHL, and thereby prevent 
enforcement of most IHL outside of the treaty system.  If one’s goal is 
to create a tool that increases compliance with humanitarian 
principles, as was the purpose of this study,139 that goal cannot be 
realized by using only a traditional assessment of customary law; in 
order to pursue its stated goals, the ICRC had to take a non-
traditional approach. 
There are two reasons, however, why this radical approach may 
prove troublesome.  First, positivist legal scholars believe that the 
international legal system is an expression of states acting in their 
 
 135. The ICRC report expressly states that it is using a traditional method for ascertaining 
customary law, however, a description of its methodology indicates otherwise.  See Introduction 
to 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 1, at xxxii. 
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 9-12 (discussing the definition of customary 
international law). 
 137. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 102 cmt. c (1987). 
 138. See Introduction to 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 
1, at xl (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing between elements of state practice and opinio 
juris). 
 139. Id. at xxvi. 
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own interests:  any legitimate international law must begin with state 
consent because no state will be pushed further than its interests 
allow.140  Otherwise, a law would not be enforceable.  Whether the 
ICRC likes it or not, the international legal system fundamentally 
rests upon the building block of sovereign states and their willingness 
to govern their own actions.141  Perhaps the ICRC is a proxy for 
individual victims of war, but those individuals are not states and do 
not have a voice under the traditional international legal system.142  
The international legal system is like an organization made up of 
practitioners vowing to raise standards, but once it is no longer 
beneficial for the practitioners to follow the mutually-agreed upon 
rules or the practitioner has enough political (or military, in the case 
of states) capital to avoid them, they need not conform to the system.  
Positivist theory leads to the conclusion that states generally only 
create international commitments when it is in their interest to do 
so.143 
Customary law can only be understood from a positivist 
perspective when the states reflect positivist ideals—when states 
determine that it is within their interests to practice the norm.144  
Thus, state practice, or lack of protest of other states’ practice, is the 
consent that gives rise, under positivist analysis, to a legitimate rule of 
customary law.  If a rule is not customary law until there is 
widespread opinio juris, then all states already believe themselves to 
be legally obligated and have no reason to object to an articulation of 
that law.  However, when the ICRC relies on treaties that state has 
not signed; the organization’s own practices and legal opinions; the 
practices of other international organizations; and international 
tribunals without jurisdiction over that state to justify the articulation 
of law, the state has not consented to being governed by that law, 
particularly if the state’s practices are contrary to the law.  If a state 
did not consent to be bound by the rules laid out by the ICRC, it will 
 
 140. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 3 (2005) (arguing that international law is a product of states pursuing their own interests). 
 141. The principle of state consent to abide by the rules of IHL raises an interesting 
question with regard to multinational non-state actors.  They operate entirely outside of this 
system, so the consent theory of international law simply does not apply.  However, it is 
generally thought that they are bound by the portions of customary IHL that govern individual 
behavior.  Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Human Rights Violations Arising from Conduct of Non-State 
Actors, 11 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 21, 27-29 (2005). 
 142. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text. 
 143. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 140, at 3. 
 144. See id. 
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not follow them (assuming that other international bodies the state 
feels bound to comply with do not adopt the ICRC’s version of 
customary IHL) and therefore, the ICRC’s project fails in its goal of 
increasing humanitarianism through international law. 
This leads to a second issue regarding the ICRC’s unorthodox 
approach.  If states reject the ICRC’s list of customary rules, then the 
ICRC’s image will be tarnished and its ability to carry out its work 
will be diminished.  As discussed above, the ICRC depends largely 
upon a perception of neutrality and integrity to obtain state consent 
to access detainees and other victims of war.145  If the ICRC is too 
radical in its conclusions, states will begin to disregard IHL.  The 
ICRC’s goal of increasing humanitarian practice during war would 
not be achieved and the organization would be the ideologue its 
critics fear it is becoming.146 
Despite the criticism of the ICRC’s untraditional methodology, 
none of its rules are particularly surprising because they reflect the 
ICRC’s previously-stated impression of the law (which is of course a 
major methodological problem).  In the international community, 
there is an acceptance of the fact that in the area of IHL, there is a 
significant gap between what states (and non-state parties to conflicts) 
actually do and what they should do.147  Such a gap is reflected in the 
difference between state practice and treaty requirements.148  
However, not all states are parties to all IHL treaties, even though 
they may agree with the treaty’s basic tenets—often the refusal to join 
a treaty regime is due to disagreement over one or two clauses or 
over the enforcement mechanism.149  In other words, for the most 
part, states generally agree on the basic tenets of IHL, even on those 
portions that are not reflected in the Geneva Conventions. 
The ICRC list of customary IHL rules could be seen as reflecting 
those broad agreements.  The study depended heavily upon states’ 
 
 145. Swiss Neutrality, supra note 31. 
 146. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 53-57. 
 147. Meron, supra note 76, at 363. 
 148. See id. at 363 n.47. 
 149. For example, though the United States generally supports the propositions in Protocol 
I and considers many of them to be customary law, including the medical care provisions, it did 
not agree with the exception that allowed belligerent groups who were unable to distinguish 
themselves to get POW status even though fixed distinction is normally a requirement for POW 
status.  It also did not agree with the decision to raise conflicts in which non-state parties were 
fighting a colonist or racist regime to international conflict status.  Theodor Meron, Comment, 
The Time Has Come for the United States to Ratify Geneva Protocol I, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 678, 
679, 681 (1994). 
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policies as reflected in their military manuals and in condemnations of 
actions not in compliance with the rule, which are good indicators of 
what states believe their practice should be.150  Additionally, in most 
cases, the rule was supported by at least one treaty, usually the 
Geneva Conventions, the Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, the 
1954 Hague Convention, or another broadly supported treaty such as 
the International Convent of Civil and Political Rights or the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, indicating that most states 
were already willing to be bound by some version of that rule.151  Thus 
Customary International Humanitarian Law is probably an accurate 
reflection of the broad consensus (with exceptions) of what states 
proclaim IHL should be.  However, this is not the accepted definition 
of customary international law. 
The ICRC focuses on what states believe rules should be instead 
of what states actually practice.  But this is not unique in the arenas of 
IHL and international human rights law, where activists, and even 
judges in international tribunals, are quick to accept aspirational goals 
as customary law in order to allow the law to progress without the 
challenges created by relying on treaties.152  This shortcut is not new:  
 
 150. 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 1, passim (see, for 
example, the relative use of military manuals and condemnations in the discussion of the section 
of Rule 53 that refers to sieges that cause starvation on pages 1139-41). 
 151. One hundred ninety-four “states” are party to the Geneva Conventions, 163 states are 
party to Protocol I, 159 are party to Protocol II, 114 are party to the 1954 Hague Convention, 
147 are party to the ICCPR, and 191 are party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
There are approximately 193 states in the world, including the Vatican, but not including 
Taiwan or the Cook Islands, the latter of which is party to numerous conventions, including the 
Geneva Conventions and its Protocols, but is a free association with New Zealand and has the 
right to declare independence at any time.  ICRC, States Party to the Geneva Conventions and 
Their Protocols, supra note 70; Jean-Philipe Lavoyer, A Milestone for International 
Humanitarian Law, ICRC, Sept. 22, 2006, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/ 
geneva-conventions-statement-220906?opendocument; ICRC, Treaties & Documents by Topic, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/TOPICS?OpenView (last visited Jan. 16, 2006); European 
Parliament, Conventions of the United Nations and of the Council of Europe on Human Rights, 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/libe/elsj/charter/un_legislation_en.htm (last visited July 24, 
2006); CIA, The World Factbook: Cook Islands, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ 
factbook/geos/cw.html (last visited July 24, 2006). 
 152. See, e.g., Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881-85 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing to United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions, law review articles, treaties, and national 
legislation); Kadić v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 241-44 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing to UNGA resolutions, 
treaties, and American caselaw); JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 
FOR THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS (WITH THE DISSENTING OPINION OF 
THE SOVIET MEMBER): NUREMBERG 30TH SEPTEMBER AND 1ST OCTOBER, 1946, 38-42 (1946) 
(arguing that the newly-minted military tribunal charter did not violate ex post facto principles 
because it reflected customary law) [hereinafter JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL]. 
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it was used in the post-WWII Nuremberg trials and in American 
court cases involving the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).153  Meron, later a 
judge himself, observed that, 
Given the scarcity of actual practice . . . in reality, tribunals have 
been guided, and are likely to continue to be guided, by the degree 
of offensiveness of certain acts to human dignity; the more heinous 
the act, the more the tribunal will assume that it violates not only a 
moral principle of humanity but also a positive norm of customary 
law.154 
Even though the ICRC has bent the rules of assessing customary law, 
that fact is probably irrelevant outside of academic discussion because 
the definition of customary international law is changing, at least with 
regard to IHL and international human rights law.  As Meron noted, 
the legitimacy of customary rules promulgated in this area is 
determined more by what states and judges think ought to be the rule 
(by what is morally offensive) than whether the rule reflects actual 
state practice.155  In so doing, the ICRC is rejecting the theory of legal 
positivism and its traditional evaluation of customary law.  If the 
international community regards these rules as being a reasonable 
articulation of what IHL ought to be, it will cite to them frequently, 
and over time, the ICRC’s list will probably become law through 
precedent.156 
II.  THE IMPACT OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 
The real importance of the work will be measured by how states, 
judges, and other international actors perceive the rules laid out by 
the ICRC.  If enough institutions regard the ICRC’s listing as being 
accurate, regardless of whether it is or not, gradually, the list will 
become the law in the area, just as restatements published by the 
American Law Institute become more authoritative the more judges 
and lawyers regard them as the law.157  Ostensibly, the work was not 
 
 153. JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note 152, at 38-42. 
 154. Meron, supra note 76, at 361.  See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern 
Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 769-70 
(2001). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See infra Part II.B. 
 157. For example, the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States was 
originally regarded as a work produced by academics wishing to push a particular agenda and 
not as an accurate reflection of law.  See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as 
a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1148-49 (1990).  However, 
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intended to be the final word on what customary IHL encompasses.158  
However, it can be assumed that those involved in the process were 
aware that such articulation may be too easy a tool for judges and 
lawyers to resist.159 
A. State Reaction to Customary International Humanitarian Law 
Thus far there has not been an outpouring of official state 
reaction to the study, so it is unclear exactly how states view it.  
However, the lack of an immediate protest signifies that states are 
unwilling to publicly denounce progressive IHL norms.  The work is 
long and detailed, and it is also likely that states are either still 
reviewing it carefully before making a statement or are adopting a 
wait and see attitude. 
Perhaps the most awaited response is that of the United States.  
The United States has the most expensive military in the world160 and 
engages it often, so its response could have a significant impact on 
whether the 161 rules are actually implemented.161  Since the ICRC is 
viewed as anti-American,162 a positive response from the United 
States toward its study would be an important sign of its legitimacy.  
Though American bloggers on both sides of the issue are engaged in a 
lively debate over the study, there has not yet been an official 
statement from the government.163  Certainly, the longer the United 
 
because international law is vague and unclear, it began to be cited by judges and justices as the 
best approximation of the law.  In 1993, Justice Scalia “rel[ied] on the Restatement (Third) for 
the relevant principles of international law,” and also noted that, “[w]hether the Restatement 
precisely reflects international law in every detail matters little here.”  Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California, 509 U.S. 764, 818 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Later, a majority of the Supreme 
Court adopted Scalia’s methodology.  F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 
164-65 (2004) (using the Restatement as an authoritative source of law). 
 158. Yves Sandoz, Foreword to 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 
supra note 1, at xvii. 
 159. See Another ICRC Issue, supra note 115. 
 160. See Petter Stalenheim et al., Military Expenditure, 2006 STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RES. 
INST. Y.B.: ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT & INT’L SEC., available at 
http://yearbook2006.sipri.org/chap8.  Meanwhile, China probably the world’s largest military in 
terms of the number of active duty soldiers.  ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN & MARTIN KLEIBER, 
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, ASIAN CONVENTIONAL MILITARY BALANCE IN 2006: 
OVERVIEW OF MAJOR ASIAN POWERS 24 (2006), available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/ 
pubs/060626_asia_balance_powers.pdf. 
 161. Because the United States is such a military powerhouse and engages in warfare so 
often, the decision as to whether to conform to the ICRC rules could have a significant affect on 
the way wars are fought. 
 162. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57. 
 163. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. 
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States waits to make a statement, the more it will seem to have 
acquiesced to the study’s conclusions.164  Despite perceived clashes 
between the United States and ICRC, a recent U.S. Department of 
State attorney indicated that the general attitude within the 
government toward the ICRC was one of deference and credibility, 
and that the study would be given significant weight, though it would 
not be considered dispositive.165  Though the United States will 
probably generally accept the study, it will not change its views in the 
areas where the United States and ICRC already disagreed, such as 
whether the Geneva Conventions contain any gaps in coverage and 
over the interpretation of Common Article 3.166 
B. Judicial Response to the Rules 
The legal minds of the world are tempted to use articulations of 
vague areas of the law as law, though the articulations may contain 
inaccuracies.  For example, in Hartford Fire, Justice Scalia cited to the 
American Restatement of Foreign Relations Law while 
acknowledging that it may not accurately reflect international law.167  
However, referencing works by individuals or organizations that have 
studied the issue in detail probably results in more accurate 
assessments of the law by adjudicators than if that resource were 
unavailable; a judge with a large caseload is unlikely to conduct a 
comprehensive study of the state practice behind a particular alleged 
customary law, especially when that study has already been 
undertaken by someone else.168 
It is likely that American judges and advocates will use the rules 
articulated by the ICRC to allow more IHL cases into American 
courts under the ATS, which gives U.S. federal courts jurisdiction 
over non-Americans suing for violations of U.S. treaties and 
customary international law.169  The ICRC study provides American 
judges, some of whom may be unfamiliar with the intricacies of IHL, 
with a ready-made list of what the customary laws are.  U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent supports these judges’ reliance on academic treatises 
 
 164. See Another ICRC Issue, supra note 115. 
 165. Interview with Curtis A. Bradley, Professor, Duke University School of Law, in 
Durham, North Carolina (Dec. 1, 2005). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 168. For an example of a justice attempting such a study, see The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 
677, 686-712 (1900). 
 169. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
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by stating that when attempting to ascertain the state of customary 
international law, 
[R]esort must be had to the works of jurists and commentators, 
who by years of labor, research, and experience, have made 
themselves particularly well acquainted with the subjects of which 
they treat . . . not for the speculations of their authors concerning 
what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the 
law really is.170 
This excerpt stresses that the scholarly works the judge could rely on 
must reflect the law as it actually is; this would at first appear to be a 
stumbling block for the application of the ICRC study.  However, to 
establish the parameters of customary law, more recent American 
justices and judges have been quick to use documents such as 
restatements, UN General Assembly resolutions, and treaty texts as 
proxies for a detailed examination of state practice.171 
Lawyers and judges in the international courts will have an even 
more pronounced tendency to cite to the ICRC study because they 
both deal with the issues more frequently and tend to have a broader 
definition of what constitutes customary international law than their 
American counterparts.  In fact, the study has already been cited at 
the international level:  an expert arguing before the ICJ on behalf of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo cited the study generally, calling it 
“un nouvel ouvrage de reference” (a new work of reference).172  If the 
work is viewed as reference material by a large number of 
practitioners, its perceived legitimacy will continue to rise.  
Unfortunately for this particular expert, his country lost the case, and 
the judgment did not refer to the ICRC’s study.173 
However, an ICTY decision on an interlocutory appeal in 
Hadihasanović cited to Customary International Humanitarian Law 
seven times, each time accepting the ICRC’s articulation of the rule 
 
 170. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. 
 171. See, e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004); Hartford 
Fire, 509 U.S. at 818 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Kadić v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 241-44 (2d Cir. 1995); 
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881-85 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 172. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) (Oral 
Arguments of Apr. 25, 2005 at 15:00) at 32, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ 
ico/ico_cr/ico_icr2005-13_translation_20050425.pdf (last visited July 24, 2006). 
 173. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) 
(Judgment of Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ico/ico_ 
judgments/ico_judgment_20051219.pdf (last visited July 24, 2006). 
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as entirely accurate.174  All citations were to the first volume, 
indicating that the judge was more interested in the parameters of the 
rule rather than the state practice justifying its articulation.175  The 
decision was issued before the study was officially released, most 
likely because the decision’s author, Theodor Meron, a member of 
the steering committee and research team for the ICRC’s project, 
already had a copy.176  Because the rules were cited so often and with 
such deference, this could be an indication that, at least in 
international tribunals, the ICRC’s listing will be treated as 
authoritatively reflecting actual customary law.  However, any lawyer 
generalizing the Hadihasanović decision must do so cautiously given 
the personal connection between Meron and the ICRC’s treatise.  
Nevertheless, Meron’s practice of treating Customary International 
Humanitarian Law as the last word on customary IHL will surely 
spread. 
Because the ICRC provides a shortcut for judges who apply 
customary IHL, it most likely will be cited often by judges in 
international tribunals and perhaps by judges in American courts.  
The more that lawyers and judges rely upon the work as a trustworthy 
reference, the more legitimate the study will become.  Even if the 
rules articulated are not accurate reflections of customary IHL in the 
traditional sense, judges and advocates will make them the law 
through practice and precedent. 
CONCLUSION 
With the publication of Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, the ICRC is in keeping with its long history of participating in 
the development of law in this area.  The ICRC’s tradition of 
neutrality and integrity means that states will most likely rely on and 
use the 161 rules articulated in the treatise.  Though many have 
questioned whether the ICRC can continue to avoid the political fray, 
this careful and scholarly work is a product of an organization more 
 
 174. Prosecutor v. Hadihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-AR73.3, Decision on Joint Defence 
Interlocutory Appeal of Trial Chamber Decision on Rule 98BIS Motions for Acquittal, ¶¶ 17, 
29-30, 38, 45-46 (Mar. 11, 2005). 
 175. Volume 1 articulates each rule and provides a commentary explaining the rule’s 
parameters and defining terms and phrases.  Volume 2, not cited in this opinion, lists in detail 
the state practice (used loosely) justifying each rule. 
 176. Perhaps like the ICRC, Meron is a sort of monarch in the realm of IHL:  he helps to 
create the laws, adjudicates in accordance with them, and otherwise comments on them.  
Acknowledgements to 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 
xxi-xxii. 
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interested in ensuring adequate treatment of the victims of war than 
in playing political games. 
Though the work is the product of many years of extensive 
research, it does not reflect the customary IHL rules in the traditional 
sense of customary law.  Rather, the treatise mirrors the reality of 
IHL:  actual state practice does not reflect the aspirational goals that 
states generally agree upon.  Customary International Humanitarian 
Law accurately states the goals that each state and each non-state 
belligerent party ought to set for themselves.  Because of the ease of 
citing to the rules, judges in domestic and international courts will 
probably agree that they should dictate proper behavior during war.  
If the ICRC’s goal in writing down 161 rules was to provide a tool 
that the world can use to promote the compliance and progression of 
IHL, then it has succeeded. 
